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LAWYER SPEECH IN THE REGULATORY STATE
Renee Newman Knake*
[C]riticism of their colleagues by public employees should be considered
one of the most highly valued of speech activities . . . .1

*

*

*

[T]he speech of a lawyer[] . . . is subject to independent regulation by
canons of the profession. Those canons provide an obligation to speak in
certain instances. And where that is so, the government’s own interest in
forbidding that speech is diminished.2

INTRODUCTION
The expansion of the modern regulatory state demands a corresponding
safeguard to ensure that officials act in the public’s interest and advance
democratic values.3 Preserving space for free-flowing speech about
corruption, illegal behavior, and other wrongdoing within the government
agency workplace is an important way to protect the public, promote
democracy, and preserve institutional legitimacy. While it is true that “[t]he
tendency of officials to abuse their public trust is a theme that has
permeated political thought from classical times to the present,”4 the value
of speech directed to curb the abuse of power is especially high in our
modern era of massive government bureaucracy5 accompanied by the rise
* Many thanks to the participants of the Fordham Law Review colloquium on Lawyering in
the Regulatory State and especially to Bruce Green, Russ Pearce, and Laurel Terry for their
thoughtful comments. For an overview of the colloquium, see Nancy J. Moore, Foreword:
Lawyering in the Regulatory State, 84 FORDHAM L. REV. 1811 (2016).
1. Vincent Blasi, The Checking Value in First Amendment Theory, 1977 AM. B.
FOUND. RES. J. 521, 634.
2. Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 446 (2006) (Breyer, J. dissenting).
3. Note, Rethinking the Professional Responsibilities of Federal Agency Lawyers, 115
HARV. L. REV. 1170, 1181 (2002). Whereas the public interest is typically meant to
“connote a single, transcendent outcome that would best serve community welfare without
reference to democratically expressed preferences,” the notion of democratic values
“connotes those aspects of agency decisionmaking that promote the agency’s legitimacy in a
democratic system of government.” Id. “These democratic values include conformity with
established law, public participation, and sensitivity to discernible public preferences,”
among other things. Id.
4. Blasi, supra note 1, at 529 (citations omitted) (referencing philosophers and theorists
such as Aristotle, Montesquieu, Madison, Mill, Cooke, Locke, and Popper).
5. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Constitutionalism After the New Deal, 101 HARV. L.
REV. 421, 421–22 (1987) (“The post-New Deal increase in presidential power, and the
creation of a massive bureaucracy concentrated in the executive branch, have augmented
factional power and self-interested representation, often leading to regulation that fails to
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of the “national surveillance state.”6 This is because, while courts may “set
the constitutional contours” of the regulatory state, it is administrative
agencies that determine the functional day-to-day application.7 Indeed,
“[i]n many areas, the constitutional law enunciated in formal [agency]
opinions and memoranda . . . is sometimes at least as important as any
decision of Article III courts.”8
One obvious source of a check on government power in the regulatory
state is government employee speech. Under current First Amendment
jurisprudence, however, minimal protection exists for this sort of speech.
This is true even for government lawyers and judges,9 despite the unique
professional obligations required of those licensed to practice law or hold
judicial office.
The minimal protection for the speech of lawyers employed by the
regulatory state is surprising given the special duties placed on members of
the legal profession, which demand greater accountability as officers of the
court and conservators of the rule of law than what is expected of most
government employees. These obligations are even higher for members of
the legal profession working in government office than for private
attorneys, because government lawyers and judges “cannot be partisan
advocates for any single position. Quite the opposite, [they] must pay heed
to a range of parties and interests when undertaking any action.”10 This
treatment of lawyer speech is also surprising because lawyers employed by
the regulatory state increasingly function as whistleblowers,11

serve the interests of the public at large.”). From 2009 to 2012, Sunstein was Administrator
of the White House Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs for the Obama
Administration. See Cass R. Sunstein, HARV. L. SCH., http://hls.harvard.edu/faculty/
directory/10871/Sunstein (last visited Mar. 27, 2016) [https://perma.cc/H3H7-UYJ6].
6. Jack M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, The Processes of Constitutional Change:
From Partisan Entrenchment to the National Surveillance State, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 489,
489–90 (2006).
7. Alan B. Morrison, What If . . . Buckley Were Overturned?, 16 CONST. COMMENT.
347, 347 (1999).
8. Balkin & Levinson, supra note 6, at 498. According to Professors Balkin and
Levinson, “The most obvious example over the past five years is the [Office of Legal
Counsel within the Department of Justice’s] enunciation of the broad scope of presidential
power in foreign affairs, leading, in one notorious example, to a crabbed and narrow reading
of what constitutes ‘torture’ banned by domestic law and international treaties” which “also
offered . . . highly disturbing views about the essentially unconstrained powers that the
President enjoys under Article II.” Id. at 498–99.
9. It is notable that the two U.S. Supreme Court decisions most damaging to First
Amendment protection for government employee speech involve lawyers. See Connick v.
Myers, 461 U.S. 138 (1983) (holding that the First Amendment rights of an assistant district
attorney discharged for circulation of a questionnaire regarding office conditions to
coworkers were not violated); Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410 (2006) (holding that the
First Amendment rights of a prosecutor who experienced retaliation after reporting
investigatory misconduct were not violated).
10. Note, supra note 3, at 1181.
11. See, e.g., Orly Lobel, Lawyering Loyalties: Speech Rights and Duties Within
Twenty-First-Century New Governance, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 1245 (2009) (discussing
concerns present when public and private sector attorneys are not protected for
whistleblowing).
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gatekeepers,12 and compliance officers.13 Many also serve in quasi-judicial
roles within various administrative agencies.14
As the regulatory state continues to grow,15 the public is in greater need
of affordable, well-organized governmental accountability. One solution
might be to offer greater First Amendment protection to all government
employees acting in a whistleblowing, gatekeeping, or compliance capacity.
This expansion, however, surely would come at the cost of efficiency and
control of the workplace for the government acting as an employer to
manage day-to-day office functions.16 Another solution is to offer greater
protection to some, but not all, government employees. The latter is
explored here—strong protection for government lawyer speech when
engaged in assessment of the workplace. This speech has been described as
“speech about ‘the manner in which government is operated[,] the
protection of which was a central purpose of the First Amendment.”17 To
be clear, in this Article I am concerned about a very specific sort of speech
by lawyers: what I will call workplace assessment—namely, the speech
that serves as a check on government abuse by “information providing,”

12. See, e.g., Ted Schneyer, An Interpretation of Recent Developments in the Regulation
of Law Practice, 30 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 559, 595–603, 608 (2005) (detailing several
developments and trends, such as: “a shift in the regulatory center of gravity toward
Washington with a corresponding shift from judicial to legislative and administrative
regulation; [and a] greater emphasis on regulation that makes lawyers gatekeepers in order to
protect public or third-party, rather than client, interests”); see also David B. Wilkins,
Making Context Count: Regulating Lawyers After Kaye, Scholer, 66 S. CAL. L. REV. 1145,
1164 (1993) (citing Reinier H. Kraakman, Gatekeepers: The Anatomy of a Third-Party
Enforcement Strategy, 2 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 53, 53 (1986)) (identifying the lawyer’s role in
preventing client misconduct by employing the “gatekeeper strategy” in which “the lawyer
can refuse to participate in the disputed transaction or otherwise withhold support in a
manner that makes it more difficult for the client to accomplish its illicit purpose”).
13. See, e.g., Michele DeStefano, Creating a Culture of Compliance:
Why
Departmentalization May Not Be the Answer, 10 HASTINGS BUS. L.J. 71 (2014).
14. See, e.g., Terence G. Ison, Administrative Law—The Operational Realities, 22 CAN.
J. ADMIN. L. & PRAC. 315 (2009).
15. See, e.g., John P. Dwyer, The Practice of Federalism Under the Clean Air Act, 54
MD. L. REV. 1183, 1184 (1995) (citations omitted) (observing that “[i]n the last thirty years,
we also have witnessed a spectacular growth of the federal regulatory state” and listing
examples of “a vast range of social legislation establishing new responsibilities, rights, and
remedies to protect the environment, public health, and occupational safety”). Expanded
protection under the First Amendment has paralleled the growth of the regulatory state,
though not in the contexts of government employee or government lawyer speech. See David
Yassky, Eras of the First Amendment, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 1699, 1730 (1991) (“Not only did
the post-New Deal government possess unprecedented interventionist powers, but it
consolidated these powers within relatively unaccountable administrative agencies. Faced
with the task of reconstituting the Founding commitment to liberty in response to these
challenges, the Court invigorated the Bill of Rights’ non-economic guarantees of personal
freedom—most energetically, the speech and press clauses of the First Amendment.”).
16. See Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 423 (2006); Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138,
149–54 (1983).
17. Connick, 461 U.S. at 156 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting Mills v. Alabama, 384
U.S. 214, 218 (1966)).
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As Randy Kozel explains in

When an employee keeps the public abreast of office operations and
issues, she is performing an information-providing function. When the
information she is providing pertains to potential inefficiencies in the
employer’s office, she is performing a watchdogging function. And when
the topics of her speech are not inefficiencies but illegalities, she is
performing a whistleblowing function.19

Professional and occupational speech, and especially lawyer speech,
historically has received scant attention from First Amendment theorists.20
Recently, however, a handful of scholars have turned their attention to this
topic, perhaps in part due to the controversial nature of Garcetti v.
Ceballos,21 as well as increased focus on occupational licensing22 and
publicity surrounding government lawyers as whistleblowers.23 The
attention may also be a function of a recent spate of decisions among lower
courts involving the level of scrutiny to be applied when a government
employee’s speech is restricted.24 Or it could be due simply to the
expanding number of government lawyers. As the regulatory state has
grown at all levels in local, state, and federal government, so has the
number of government attorneys—126,450 employed in the United States
in 2014 according to the Bureau of Labor Statistics, or 21 percent of all
18. See Randy J. Kozel, Reconceptualizing Public Employee Speech, 99 NW. U. L. REV.
1007, 1038 (2005).
19. Id.
20. See, e.g., W. Bradley Wendel, Free Speech for Lawyers, 28 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q.
305, 305 (2001) (“One of the most important unanswered questions in legal ethics is how the
constitutional guarantee of freedom of expression ought to apply to the speech of attorneys
acting in their official capacity.”). This is especially true regarding scholarship about the
ethical obligations of government lawyers. See Allan C. Hutchinson, ‘In the Public Interest’:
The Responsibilities and Rights of Government Lawyers, 46 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 105, 106
(2008) (“[L]ittle energy has been directed towards defining and defending the role and duties
of government lawyers. Not only do the various official codes of professional conduct
remain almost silent . . . there is also a paucity of academic literature and professional
commentary . . . .”).
21. 547 U.S. 410 (2006); see, e.g., Jeffrey W. Stempel, The Worst Supreme Court Case
Ever? Identifying, Assessing, and Exploring Low Moments of the High Court, 12 NEV. L.J.
516, 523 (2012) (“My own pick for ‘worst’ case is Garcetti v. Ceballos, in which the Court
denied a retaliatory discharge claim based on the purported First Amendment rights of a
government employee . . . .”).
22. See, e.g., Robert Post & Amanda Shanor, Adam Smith’s First Amendment, 128
HARV. L. REV. F. 165, 165 (2015) (critiquing the D.C. Circuit’s recent decision striking a
licensing requirement for tour guides on First Amendment grounds and observing that
“[u]ntil very recently, it was well accepted that purely economic regulations are subject to
rational basis review”).
23. See, e.g., Jesselyn Radack, When Whistle-Blowers Suffer, L.A. TIMES (Apr. 27,
2010),
http://articles.latimes.com/2010/apr/27/opinion/la-oe-radack-20100427
[https://
perma.cc/P2M9-WXYK]; see also Heidi Kitrosser, Leak Prosecutions and the First
Amendment: New Developments and a Closer Look at the Feasibility of Protecting Leakers,
56 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1221 (2015).
24. See, e.g., Julian W. Kleinbrodt, Pro-Whistleblower Reform in the Post-Garcetti Era,
112 MICH. L. REV. 111, 115 (2013) (“Garcetti has produced general confusion in the lower
courts.” (citations omitted)).
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lawyers.25 This is an increase from 105,130 government attorneys a decade
ago (20 percent of all lawyers)26 and only 38,062 half a century ago (14.2
percent of all lawyers).27
In my earlier work, I articulated a First Amendment theory supporting
strong protection for attorney advice and advocacy.28 In my view, a
lawyer’s speech as advisor and advocate not only holds First Amendment
value for the client and for the public, but also for the functioning of
American democracy.29 This is supported both by foundational values
undergirding the First Amendment as well as Supreme Court doctrine.30 In
this Article, I build upon that analysis to posit that lawyers for the
regulatory state ought not to be treated as government employees for
purposes of the First Amendment when engaged in speech about workplace
conditions related to curbing abuse of power, corruption, or other illegality.
While my position runs counter to the existing precedent of closely divided
Supreme Court decisions, it finds support in a historical and philosophical
understanding of free speech principles.
The workplace assessment speech I am contemplating here goes to the
heart of First Amendment values. Consider, for example, the “checking
value” of lawyer speech for the regulatory state.31 Lawyers often will be in
the best position to act as a check on government abuse of power in light of
the responsibilities placed upon the legal profession to maintain our
democratic form of government.32 As such, this Article suggests that the
25. U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, OCCUPATIONAL EMPLOYMENT
WAGES, MAY 2014 (2014), http://www.bls.gov/oes/current/oes231011.htm [https://
perma.cc/4AVT-FXZ3]. This figure includes 52,550 local government lawyers, 39,790 state
government lawyers, and 34,220 federal executive branch lawyers. Id. The total number of
lawyers for 2014 according to the Bureau of Labor Statistics was 603,310. Id.
26. U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, OCCUPATIONAL EMPLOYMENT
AND WAGES, MAY 2004 (2004), http://www.bls.gov/oes/2004/may/oes231011.htm [https://
perma.cc/SP73-3HX7]. This figure includes 48,760 local government lawyers, 32,100 state
government lawyers, and 24,270 federal executive branch lawyers. Id. According to the
Bureau of Labor Statistics, the total number of lawyers for 2004 was 521,130. Id.
27. AM. BAR FOUND., THE 1971 LAWYER STATISTICAL REPORT 12 (Bette H. Sikes et al.
eds., 1972) (statistics from 1963). The total number of lawyers in 1963 was 269,069,
according to the report. Id. at 5.
28. See generally Renee Newman Knake, Attorney Advice and the First Amendment, 68
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 639 (2012).
29. Id.
30. See id. at 675–77 (discussing philosophical foundations for protecting attorney
advice under the First Amendment); id. at 664–72 (discussing doctrinal foundations for
protecting attorney advice under the First Amendment, including Legal Services Corp. v.
Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533 (2001), Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350 (1977), and
NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963)).
31. See Blasi, supra note 1, at 521.
32. See, e.g., Goldfarb v. Va. State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 792 (1975) (“[L]awyers are
essential to the primary governmental function of administering justice, and have historically
been ‘officers of the courts.’” (quoting Sperry v. Florida ex rel. Fla. Bar, 373 U.S. 379, 383
(1963))); MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT pmbl. ¶¶ 10–11 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2014) (“The
legal profession is largely self-governing. . . . [It] is unique in this respect because of the
close relationship between the profession and the processes of government and law
enforcement.”). As such, “[s]elf-regulation also helps maintain the legal profession’s
independence from government domination.” Id. This is critical because “[a]n independent
AND
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speech of lawyers for the regulatory state warrants heightened protection
when it is serving this checking-value function.
The Article proceeds as follows. Part I critiques two highly controversial
split decisions from the Supreme Court ascribing minimal First Amendment
protection to government lawyer speech—Connick v. Meyers33 and Garcetti
v. Ceballos.34 While I certainly am not the first to question the outcomes of
Connick and Garcetti (indeed, some call Garcetti one of the worst Supreme
Court opinions ever),35 the significance of workplace assessment speech by
lawyers in the context of the regulatory state largely has escaped the
attention of commentators and courts.36 This Article helps fill that void.
Part II then turns to an explanation of why lawyers are different from
other government employees. Here, I explore three justifications for
heightened protection. First, government lawyers’ speech, because of their
special training and education, can serve important political functions,
including acting as a check against government misconduct. Second, the
speech of lawyers is subject to special professional duties not typically
placed on government employees. Third, similar to judges, lawyers serving
the regulatory state must act beyond the interests that guide a private
practice attorney, taking into account the agency’s role within the overall
government structure as well as the public’s interest.
The conclusion proposes a framework to be applied to the workplace
assessment speech of government lawyers when acting as a check on the
power of the regulatory state. By applying this framework, rather than what
the Court did in Connick and Garcetti, in the future, members of the legal
profession faced with concerns about governmental abuse of power will be
permitted to exercise professional judgment to report wrongdoing—and be
protected when they do so. Protecting government lawyers’ workplace
assessment speech can serve as a critical check against abuse of power by
officials and help legitimize the role of the regulatory state in American
democracy.

legal profession is an important force in preserving government under law, for abuse of legal
authority is more readily challenged by a profession whose members are not dependent on
government for the right to practice.” Id.
33. 461 U.S. 138 (1983).
34. 547 U.S. 410 (2006).
35. See Stempel, supra note 21, at 523.
36. A Lexis search for sources addressing the First Amendment protection for
government employee speech resulted in over 1000 articles, compared to only a dozen or so
articles focusing specifically on the speech of lawyers and judges as whistleblowing
government employees in the wake of Connick and Garcetti. This search was conducted on
July 2, 2015, and the results are on file with the author. Perhaps this is due to a systemic
inattention to members of the legal profession as employees of the regulatory state—it has
been observed that “[g]overnment lawyers are the orphans of legal ethics.” Hutchinson,
supra note 20, at 106.
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I. THE EVOLUTION OF FIRST AMENDMENT PROTECTION FOR
WORKPLACE ASSESSMENT SPEECH BY GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES
Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of
speech . . . .37

The First Amendment protects the freedom of expression without regard
to content or viewpoint, even if it is unpleasant, disruptive, vulgar,
offensive, or insulting. This protection, however, is not absolute, and the
government may limit speech in a number of ways, whether as the
sovereign, a regulator of professions and industries, or an employer.38 For
example, in its capacity as a sovereign, the government may establish time,
place, and manner restrictions.39 The government can restrict unprotected
speech40 and decide what viewpoints may be expressed in its own speech.41
Reasonable, content-based restrictions can be placed on which speech is
permissible on government property that is not fully open to the public.42
The government often restricts speech as the regulator of professions and
industries, for example as the regulator of lawyers,43 judges,44 prison
administrators,45 radio/television stations,46 and the military.47
37. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
38. See infra notes 39–49.
39. See, e.g., Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 115 (1972) (“[G]overnment
has no power to restrict such activity because of its message. Our cases make equally clear,
however, that reasonable ‘time, place[,] and manner’ regulations may be necessary to further
significant governmental interests, and are permitted.” (citations omitted)).
40. See, e.g., Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571–72 (1942) (“[I]t is well
understood that the right of free speech is not absolute at all times and under all
circumstances. There are certain well-defined and narrowly limited classes of speech, the
prevention and punishment of which have never been thought to raise any Constitutional
problem.” (citations omitted)).
41. See, e.g., Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 193 (1991) (“The Government can, without
violating the Constitution, selectively fund a program to encourage certain activities it
believes to be in the public interest, without at the same time funding an alternative program
which seeks to deal with the problem in another way. In so doing, the Government has not
discriminated on the basis of viewpoint; it has merely chosen to fund one activity to the
exclusion of the other.”).
42. See, e.g., Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 811
(1985) (“Although the avoidance of controversy is not a valid ground for restricting speech
in a public forum, a nonpublic forum . . . is not dedicated to general debate or the free
exchange of ideas.”).
43. See, e.g., Gentile v. State Bar of Nev., 501 U.S. 1030, 1071 (1991) (“It is
unquestionable that in the courtroom itself, during a judicial proceeding, whatever right to
‘free speech’ an attorney has is extremely circumscribed.”).
44. See, e.g., Williams-Yulee v. Fla. Bar, 135 S. Ct. 1656, 1662 (2015) (“States prohibit
judges and judicial candidates from personally soliciting funds for their campaigns. [The
Court] must decide whether the First Amendment permits such restrictions on speech. [The
Court] hold[s] that it does.”).
45. See, e.g., Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 86 (1987) (“The Court rejected the inmates’
First Amendment challenge to the ban . . . noting that judgments regarding prison security
‘are peculiarly within the province and professional expertise of corrections officials,
and . . . courts should ordinarily defer to their expert judgment in such matters.’” (quoting
Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 827 (1974))).
46. See, e.g., Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 396 (1969) (“[T]he Congress
and the Commission do not violate the First Amendment when they require a radio or
television station to give reply time to answer personal attacks and political editorials.”).
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Relevant to this Article, the government may also regulate the speech of
its employees, including government lawyers.48 Government employee
speech historically received no First Amendment protection. Justice
Holmes is famous for his line that a policeman “may have a constitutional
right to talk politics, but he has no constitutional right to be a policeman.”49
In other words, government employees had to accept their employment “on
the terms which [were] offered” to them.50
The Warren Court’s focus on individual rights,51 however, led to greater
protection for government employee speech in Pickering v. Board of
Education.52 The case involved a public school teacher fired for publishing
a letter to the editor critical of tax policy proposed by the Board of
Education.53 This is an example of the government employee as an
information provider and a watchdog.54 The Court found that government
employees do not sacrifice all free speech rights as a condition of their
employment; rather, there must be “a balance between the interests of the
teacher, as a citizen, in commenting upon matters of public concern and the
interest of the State, as an employer, in promoting the efficiency of the
public services it performs through its employees.”55 Using this balancing
test, the Court held that the teacher’s speech was protected because it
related to a matter of public concern and did not interfere with the efficient
operation of the school.56 The Court later extended Pickering protection to
a government employee speaking privately to a supervisor.57 Even when
the Court extends less protection, it recognizes that “[g]overnment
employees are often in the best position to know what ails the agencies for
which they work; public debate may gain much from their informed
opinions.”58
Subsequent decisions, however, weakened Pickering’s protection and,
interestingly, repeatedly involved workplace assessment speech by a
47. See, e.g., Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 756 (1974) (“For the reasons which
differentiate military society from civilian society, we think Congress is permitted to
legislate both with greater breadth and with greater flexibility when prescribing the rules by
which the former shall be governed than it is when prescribing rules for the latter.”).
48. See, e.g., Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 168 (1974) (“[T]he Government, as an
employer, must have wide discretion and control over the management of its personnel and
internal affairs.”).
49. See, e.g., McAuliffe v. City of New Bedford, 29 N.E. 517, 517 (1892) (upholding an
ordinance banning police officers from political fundraising).
50. Id. at 518.
51. See, e.g., William F. Swindler, The Warren Court: Completion of a Constitutional
Revolution, 23 VAND. L. REV. 205 (1970).
52. 391 U.S. 563 (1968).
53. Id. at 564–65.
54. Kozel, supra note 18, at 1038 (“Teachers are, as a class, the members of a
community most likely to have informed and definite opinions as to how funds allotted to
the operation of the schools should be spent. Accordingly, it is essential that they be able to
speak out freely on such questions without fear of retaliatory dismissal.” (quoting Pickering,
391 U.S. at 572)).
55. Id. at 1015 (quoting Pickering, 391 U.S. at 568).
56. Pickering, 391 U.S. at 572.
57. See Givhan v. W. Line Consol. Sch. Dist., 439 U.S. 410, 414 (1979).
58. Waters v. Churchill, 511 U.S. 661, 674 (1994).
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government lawyer.59 Connick, decided in 1983, involved a lawyer
working in the Orleans Parish District Attorney’s Office,60 and Garcetti,
decided in 2006, involved a lawyer working in the Los Angeles County
District Attorney’s office.61 As this Article goes to print, we sit at the
decade anniversary of Garcetti. This marks an important moment to reflect
upon the decision’s consequences for the government lawyer’s role and
duties engaging in workplace assessment in a regulatory state, particularly
given that the opinion is perhaps the most disparaged free speech case ever
rendered by the Court. A brief overview of both cases lays out the critical
tensions involved when the government, as an employer, seeks to manage
the workplace by silencing speech on government abuse.
A. Connick v. Myers
In Connick v. Myers, an assistant district attorney’s employment was
terminated based on her circulation of a questionnaire addressing workplace
concerns.62 Sheila Myers argued that this violated her First Amendment
rights.63 The Supreme Court held 5-4 that it did not.64 The Court reached
this result by adopting a “public concern” threshold test to be satisfied
before applying a Pickering analysis.65 Immediately prior to Myers’s
termination, she had distributed a “questionnaire soliciting the views of her
fellow staff members concerning office transfer policy, office morale, the
need for a grievance committee, the level of confidence in supervisors, and
whether employees felt pressured to work in political campaigns.”66 Her
supervisor, District Attorney Harry Connick, soon informed her that “she
was being terminated because of her refusal to accept the transfer . . . [and]
that her distribution of the questionnaire was considered an act of
insubordination.”67
Although she won her wrongful termination claim in the lower court, the
Supreme Court overturned that result because the majority did not view the
questionnaire as sufficiently addressing matters of public concern.68 The
one exception, according to Justice White writing for the majority, was the
question about whether employees felt pressured to work in a political
campaign.69 But after evaluating the context surrounding Myers’s writing
and distribution of the questionnaire, the majority determined that the rest
of the questions were “mere extensions of Myers’[s] dispute over her
transfer to another section of the criminal court.”70
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.

See infra Part I.A–B.
Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138 (1983).
Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410 (2006).
Connick, 461 U.S. 138.
Id. at 141.
Id. at 139.
Id. at 142.
Id. at 141.
Id.
Id. at 154.
Id. at 149.
Id. at 148.

2108

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 84

The majority failed to recognize, as Justice Brennan observed in writing
for the dissent, that “[t]he First Amendment affords special protection to
speech that may inform public debate about how our society is to be
governed—regardless of whether it actually becomes the subject of a public
controversy.”71 For Justice Brennan, and Justices Blackmun, Marshall, and
Stevens joining his opinion, the proper application of a public concern test
would cover the very matters at issue in Myers’s questionnaire. This would
include issues “that could reasonably be expected to be of interest to
persons seeking to develop informed opinions about the manner in which
the Orleans Parish District Attorney, an elected official charged with
managing a vital governmental agency, discharges his responsibilities.”72
With the benefit of hindsight, we see that Justice Brennan was prescient
in his observations about the value of the speech at issue in Connick. The
Orleans Parish District Attorney’s Office, as it turns out, permitted for
decades a workplace culture that led to significant prosecutorial
misconduct, in some instances causing the wrongful incarceration of
innocent individuals for many years.73 As a New York Times article
published nearly thirty years later documented:
For the third time in 16 years and the second time in two, the Orleans
Parish district attorney’s office must explain itself before the United
States Supreme Court.
Each of the cases involves charges of prosecutorial misconduct, and in
particular the failure to turn over crucial evidence to the defense, a
constitutional violation that defense lawyers, former prosecutors and four
Supreme Court justices have said was at least at one time “pervasive” in
the district attorney’s office here. In the case last year, one of the key
issues was not whether the misconduct took place, but how widespread it
was. . . . Justice John Paul Stevens called the office’s violations “blatant
and repeated.”74

Admittedly, Myers’s questionnaire did not directly address this particular
misconduct; but her workplace assessment speech—asking questions about
the pressures faced by employees, the working performance of personnel,
office morale, and the benefit of an internal employee grievance
71. Id. at 160 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
72. Id. at 163.
73. See, e.g., David Keenan et al., The Myth of Prosecutorial Accountability After
Connick v. Thompson: Why Existing Professional Responsibility Measures Cannot Protect
Against Prosecutorial Misconduct, 121 YALE L.J.F. 203, 207–08 (2011) (describing the
wrongful conviction of John Thompson, who spent fourteen years on death row because the
Orleans Parish District Attorney’s Office withheld exculpatory evidence (citation omitted)).
Keenan et al. also note that Harry Connick, as the District Attorney of Orleans Parish,
“offered no formal training to its prosecutors regarding [exculpatory] evidence.” Id. at 207.
Connick
stopped reading legal opinions after he came to office in 1974 and was therefore
unaware of important Supreme Court rulings . . . . Shortly after Connick’s
retirement, “a survey of assistant district attorneys in the Office revealed that more
than half felt they had not received the training they needed to do their jobs.”
Id. at 207–08.
74. Campbell Robertson & Adam Liptak, Louisiana Prosecutors’ Methods Raise
Scrutiny Again, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 3, 2011, at A19.
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committee—might very well have uncovered concerns about the
misconduct resulting in multiple wrongful convictions as well as other
information that is a matter of public concern.75 Myers’s information
providing and watchdogging was intended to uncover a workplace culture
that we now know, sadly all too well, led to substantial government abuse.
B. Garcetti v. Ceballos
Two decades after Connick, the Court again addressed the scope of First
Amendment protection for government employees by taking up another
case involving an attorney, this time at the Los Angeles District Attorney’s
Office. Garcetti v. Ceballos, again a 5-4 decision, came on the heels of
“one of the worst police scandals in U.S. history, involving corruption and
widespread abuses by an anti-gang unit of the LA Police
Department . . . .”76 Eventually, this led “to the overturning of more than
100 convictions, the departure of more than a dozen officers, [and] the
payment of $70 million to victims . . . .”77 Richard Ceballos, a calendar
attorney in the district attorney’s office, wrote a memorandum raising
concerns about a case that involved possible police misconduct, specifically
the use of an affidavit with “serious misrepresentations” to secure a search
warrant.78 The memo led to a contentious meeting with his superiors,79 and
he was subpoenaed by the defense.80 Ceballos alleged that his superiors
retaliated against him by denying a promotion, among other things, for the
memo he wrote, violating his First Amendment right to freedom of
speech.81
The majority opinion, authored by Justice Kennedy, focused not on
whether the speech was a matter of public concern (because it
unquestionably was) but rather on whether the speech was made in
furtherance of official employee duties.82 According to the majority,
“[W]hen public employees make statements pursuant to their official duties,
the employees are not speaking as citizens for First Amendment purposes,
and the Constitution does not insulate their communications from employer
discipline.”83 This is true “even if his judgment in this case was sound and
appropriately expressed.”84 Thus, the majority concluded that Ceballos’s
speech was not protected, even while simultaneously recognizing that
“[e]xposing governmental inefficiency and misconduct is a matter of
considerable significance . . . .”85 In other words, before applying
Pickering, the Court first requires that an employee speak as a citizen on a
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.

See generally Connick, 461 U.S. 138.
Brief for Respondent at 1, Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410 (2006) (No. 04-473).
Id. at 2.
Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 414.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 415.
See id. at 413–26.
Id. at 421.
Id. at 432 (Souter, J., dissenting).
Id. at 425 (majority opinion).
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matter of public concern—if the employee is not speaking as a private
individual, then “the employee has no First Amendment cause of action
This
based on his or her employer’s reaction to the speech.”86
characterization ignores a fundamental aspect of the role of a lawyer, where
professional obligations require a fidelity to the democratic process and rule
of law, a point to which I return to below in Part II.
Justice Souter, writing in dissent, characterized the First Amendment
value of Ceballos’s speech differently. He explained that the “private and
public interests in addressing official wrongdoing and threats to health and
safety can outweigh the government’s stake in the efficient
implementation” of “its chosen policy and objectives.”87 According to
Justice Souter, Ceballos should have been able to claim First Amendment
protection when “speaking out against a rogue law enforcement officer,
[regardless of whether] his job requires him to express a judgment about the
officer’s performance.”88 The majority’s view, by contrast, seriously
compromises any effort to encourage whistleblowing.
Justice Souter also recognized the special obligations of lawyers which
further inform the First Amendment value of workplace assessment speech:
“Some public employees are hired to ‘promote a particular policy’ by
broadcasting a particular message set by the government, but not everyone
working for the government, after all, is hired to speak from a government
manifesto.”89 Souter would have applied Legal Services Corp. v.
Velazquez90 to protect the whistleblowing activity in Garcetti.91 In
Velazquez, in a 5-4 decision also authored by Justice Kennedy, the Court
struck down a federal restriction preventing attorneys for the Legal Services
Corporation (LSC) from challenging the validity of a state or federal
statute.92 Under the challenged restriction, the LSC attorneys were required
to cease representation immediately if a question about a statute’s validity
arose.93 Justice Kennedy’s opinion expressed the concern that, if the
legislative restriction was validated by the Court, “there would be lingering
doubt whether the truncated representation had resulted in . . . full advice to
the client . . . .”94 As a consequence, both “[t]he courts and the public
would” be left “to question the adequacy and fairness of professional
representations . . . .”95 Recognizing the importance of “an informed,
independent bar,”96 he further noted that “[w]e must be vigilant when
Congress imposes rules and conditions which in effect insulate its own laws
86. Id. at 418.
87. Id. at 428 (Souter, J., dissenting).
88. Id. at 431.
89. Id. at 437 (citing Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533, 542 (2001)).
90. 531 U.S. 533 (2001).
91. See Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 437.
92. Velazquez, 531 U.S. at 536–37 (“[T]he restriction . . . prohibits legal representation
funded by recipients of [Legal Services Corporation’s] moneys if the representation involves
an effort to amend or otherwise challenge existing welfare law.”).
93. Id. at 544–45.
94. Id. at 546.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 545.

2016]

LAWYER SPEECH IN THE REGULATORY STATE

2111

from legitimate judicial challenge”97 brought by members of the legal
profession. Similarly, the outcome of Garcetti (as well as Connick)
insulates the government from legitimate challenges brought by members of
the legal profession. Under Velazquez, government lawyer speech in this
context ought to be protected.
II. WHY LAWYER SPEECH, AND GOVERNMENT LAWYER SPEECH,
IS NOT GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEE SPEECH
Numerous commentators have critiqued the legacy of Connick and
Garcetti, calling for reform.98 For example, as one scholar has observed,
the outcomes of these cases undermine our democracy “by allowing
government officials to punish, and thus deter, whistleblowing and other
on-the-job speech that would otherwise inform voters’ views and facilitate
their ability to hold the government politically accountable for its
choices.”99 Others have argued that “the Court should have retained the
Pickering-Connick balancing inquiry and not limited the scope of the First
Amendment” in Garcetti100 and that the opinion “signals a significant shift
away from free speech rights for government employees and, even worse, a
restriction on the ability of the public to learn of government
misconduct.”101
A few scholars have endeavored to justify the Connick and Garcetti
decisions. For example, Robert Post would separate speech furthering the
government’s “managerial” authority, which it draws upon in
“administering its own institutions,” from the government’s “governance”
authority, which it demands in order to “govern the general public.”102 This
distinction is significant, according to Post, because it explains why
“[m]anagerial authority is controlled by [F]irst [A]mendment rules different
97. Id. at 548; see also Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 787 (2000) (Kennedy, J.,
dissenting) (“Laws punishing speech which protests the lawfulness or morality of the
government’s own policy are the essence of the tyrannical power the First Amendment
guards against.”).
98. See, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, The Kennedy Court: October Term 2005, 9 GREEN
BAG 2D 335, 341 (2006) (“Many fewer whistleblowers are likely to come forward without
constitutional protection.”); Stempel, supra note 21; Mark Strasser, Whistleblowing, Public
Employees, and the First Amendment, 60 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 975, 976 (2013) (“As far as the
Constitution is concerned, an individual who fulfills her professional duties by exposing
corruption or threats to public health and safety may permissibly be fired. If our recent
history teaches us anything, it is that such an understanding of constitutional protections
cannot help but undermine the public good.”).
99. Helen Norton, Constraining Public Employee Speech: Government’s Control of Its
Workers’ Speech to Protect Its Own Expression, 59 DUKE L.J. 1, 4 (2009).
100. See, e.g., Sheldon H. Nahmod, Public Employee Speech, Categorical Balancing and
§ 1983: A Critique of Garcetti v. Ceballos, 42 U. RICH. L. REV. 561, 563 (2008).
101. Chemerinsky, supra note 98, at 340.
102. Robert C. Post, Between Governance and Management: The History and Theory of
the Public Forum, 34 UCLA L. REV. 1713, 1775 (1987). For another perspective justifying
the outcome of Garcetti, see Lawrence Rosenthal, The Emerging First Amendment Law of
Managerial Prerogative, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 33, 33 (2008) (rejecting “the scholarly
consensus on Garcetti,” and observing that “although the Court’s opinion is admittedly
undertheorized, its holding is consistent with fundamental principles of First Amendment
law”).
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from those which control the exercise of the authority used by the state
when it acts to govern the general public.”103 As a consequence, he asserts
in a case like Connick, “[m]anagerial domains are necessary so that a
democratic state can actually achieve objectives that have been
democratically agreed upon.”104
My point here is narrower than these commentators, in part because of
my belief that lawyer speech at times warrants higher protection under the
First Amendment than that of others when the speech serves an advisory,
advocacy, or assessment function.105 This view is grounded upon the
premise that “a strong and forceful legal profession is a vital resource in
holding governments to democratic account and guaranteeing that all
citizens are empowered by vigorous representation in their dealings with
governing bodies and other powerful elites.”106 Consequently, it is critical
to view the protection of lawyer speech as the equivalent of protecting
professional independence, thus facilitating lawyers’ ability to “act as a
bulwark between state oppression and citizens’ freedom.”107
As a pragmatic matter, I also recognize the administrative tensions
involved if all government employee workplace assessment speech were
protected fully under the First Amendment. Given this reality, I do not join
the chorus of critics who would extend the First Amendment to all
employees.108 Instead, I contend that the speech of lawyers in this context
deserves heightened protection for at least three reasons. First, government
lawyers and judges are uniquely poised to serve as a check against agency
misconduct given their education and training. Second, the speech of
lawyers and judges is subject to special duties placed on members of the
legal profession—duties which, at times, by their nature demand that they
speak out against abuses of power. Third, much like judges, government
lawyers must function in a less partisan manner than their private
counterparts, which makes them better prepared to engage in a reasoned,
balanced inquiry in workplace assessment speech. Each of these reasons is
addressed in turn below.
A. The Checking Value of Lawyer Speech
The speech of government lawyers can serve as a check against
government misconduct, what Vincent Blasi calls the “checking value.”109
103. Post, supra note 102, at 1775.
104. Robert Post, Subsidized Speech, 106 YALE L.J. 151, 164 (1996).
105. See Knake, supra note 28, at 682.
106. Hutchinson, supra note 20, at 109.
107. Id.
108. See, e.g., discussion supra notes 98–101 and accompanying text; see also Joshua D.
Herman, The Limits on Disciplining Public Employee Speech, 103 ILL. B.J. 24, 26 (2015)
(“Garcetti’s potential for quieting whistleblowers led the Illinois legislature to amend the
Whistleblower Act and Illinois False Claims Act by providing protection for public
employees who are no longer protected by the First Amendment.”); Howard L. Zwickel, In
Support of an Implied State Constitutional Free Speech Tort in Public Employment
Retaliation Cases, 78 ALB. L. REV. 33 (2015).
109. Blasi, supra note 1.
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As Blasi explains: “The central premise of the checking value is that the
abuse of official power is an especially serious evil—more serious than the
abuse of private power, even by institutions such as large corporations
which can affect the lives of millions of people.”110 Blasi situates his idea
of the checking value in an understanding of the “moral quality of official
power”111:
First, because the investiture of public power represents a form of moral
approval, public servants are probably more likely than those who wield
private power to lose their humility and acquire an inflated sense of selfimportance, often a critical first step on the road to misconduct. Second,
since public officials have been “chosen” by the people, either directly by
election or indirectly via a chain of appointments anchored by an election,
the public is probably less inherently skeptical of officials than of
powerful private figures. . . . Third, when trust is shown to have been
abused, the cost to the society is greater if important expectations have
been defeated.112

He argues that, on balance, “systematic scrutiny and exposure of the
activities of public officials will produce more good in the form of
prevention or containment of official misbehavior.”113 Even if some
“diminution in the efficiency of the public service or weakening of the trust
that ultimately holds any political society together” might occur,114 this
compromise, for Blasi, is a worthy and preferred tradeoff.
Lawyers are particularly well suited to serve the checking function
against governmental abuse given their education and training.115 For
example, members of the legal profession can “serve as an important check
on such unleashed power by informally restraining and channeling [a
regulatory body’s] political will. By training, [government] lawyers
understand the importance of neutral principles, of fair processes, and of
rational arguments . . . .”116 Similarly, government lawyers “perform the
same function that Alexis de Tocqueville observed that they play in
American society as a whole, that of restraining ill-considered
democracy.”117 For example, while lawyers working for Congress “work to
execute the will of Congress, [they] also act to temper that will, to ensure
that it results from judgment as much as from passion.”118 Government
110. Id. at 538.
111. Id. at 540.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 552.
114. Id.
115. For example, Blasi has observed that because “recourse to the courts is one way that
victims of official misconduct may put a halt to improper government practices, a proponent
of the checking value should look favorably on the contention that the First Amendment
protects communication designed to ‘stir up’ litigation” with “the government or its
officials.” Id. at 647. Blasi would not extend this position, however, to other cases holding
that the First Amendment “includes the right to advise people on how they can secure
effective legal representation.” Id. at 646 (citations omitted).
116. John C. Yoo, Lawyers in Congress, 61 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 1, 19 (1998).
117. Id.
118. Id.
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lawyers also “are a uniquely valuable source of information about the
workings of public agencies.”119 Of course this may be true of any
government employee, but providing higher protection at least to
government lawyer speech advances “a societal interest in self-governance
[that] does outweigh governmental efficiency” without over burdening the
government’s managerial functions.120 This check on power is particularly
important in light of the ever-expanding (and arguably unconstitutional121)
regulatory state.
Relatedly, members of the legal profession are uniquely trained to “be the
conduit for . . . promulgation” of the rule of law.122 The complexity of law,
which is increasing under the expanding regulatory state, demands lawyers
to “make it accessible to those for whom it is relevant.”123 This is because
“lawyers are often better positioned than nonlawyers to realize the
unfairness or unreasonableness of a law.”124 The most “effective
representation within and operation of the system” comes from lawyers as
“sophisticated, experienced agents who know their way around the rulesystems and the courts.”125 The education and training that prepares
lawyers to navigate complex legal issues similarly makes them the preferred
segment of government employees to engage in protected workplace
assessment speech. Moreover, it has been said that lawyers establish social
order and the “normative vision” for American democracy.126 As such,
they hold “a right to participate in the creation and maintenance of the
state’s nomos that is denied to other persons in the society.”127 Indeed, “the
state’s nomos is . . . dependent on the profession.”128
B. The Professional Obligations of Lawyers
As Officers of the Court and Conservators of Democracy
Lawyers, as members of the legal profession, have enhanced
responsibilities because they are officers of the court and conservators of
democracy. These obligations not only justify protecting lawyer speech
over other employees but also ameliorate concerns about such protection

119. Kermit Roosevelt, The Costs of Agencies: Waters v. Churchill and the First
Amendment in the Administrative State, 106 YALE L.J. 1233, 1253 (1997).
120. Id.
121. See, e.g., ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION
OF THE LAW 158 (1990) (asserting that the modern regulatory state is unconstitutional,
although also refraining from invalidating it).
122. Stephen L. Pepper, Counseling at the Limits of the Law: An Exercise in the
Jurisprudence and Ethics of Lawyering, 104 YALE L.J. 1545, 1547 (1995).
123. Id. at 1547–48.
124. David Luban, Legal Ideals and Moral Obligations: A Comment on Simon, 38 WM.
& MARY L. REV. 255, 259 (1996).
125. See Robert W. Gordon, The Role of Lawyers in Producing the Rule of Law: Some
Critical Reflections, 11 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 441, 448 (2010).
126. Susan P. Koniak, The Law Between the Bar and the State, 70 N.C. L. REV. 1389,
1410 (1992).
127. Id.
128. Id.
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overly burdening the government’s interest in efficient administration of its
work. As Justice Breyer explained, dissenting in Garcetti:
[T]he speech at issue is professional speech—the speech of a lawyer.
Such speech is subject to independent regulation by canons of the
profession. Those canons provide an obligation to speak in certain
instances. And where that is so, the government’s own interest in
forbidding that speech is diminished. . . . The objective specificity and
public availability of the profession’s canons also help to diminish the
risk that the courts will improperly interfere with the government’s
necessary authority to manage its work.129

For example, the Preamble to the American Bar Association Model Rules
of Professional Conduct explains that “[t]he legal profession is largely selfgoverning. . . . [It] is unique in this respect because of the close relationship
between the profession and the processes of government and law
enforcement.”130 As such, “[s]elf-regulation also helps maintain the legal
profession’s independence from government domination.”131 This is
critical because “[a]n independent legal profession is an important force in
preserving government under law, for abuse of legal authority is more
readily challenged by a profession whose members are not dependent on
government for the right to practice.”132 Lawyers in their professional
capacity are simultaneously commanded to be “a representative of clients,
an officer of the legal system and a public citizen having special
responsibility for the quality of justice.”133 These duties obligate lawyers to
speak in certain instances beyond the scope of their employment
requirements. For example, Model Rule 1.13 contains a reporting
requirement that is triggered when a lawyer knows of certain illegal
behavior by an officer or employee of an organizational client, and Model
Rule 3.3 demands disclosure of directly adverse legal authority.134
These elements make the speech of lawyers working for the regulatory
state different than the speech of other employees. When lawyers speak in
their employment capacity, they may or may not be speaking on behalf of

129. Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 446–47 (2006) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citations
omitted).
130. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT pmbl. ¶ 10 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2014).
131. Id. ¶ 11.
132. Id.
133. Id. ¶ 1.
134. See id. ¶ 1.13(b) (“If a lawyer for an organization knows that an officer, employee or
other person associated with the organization is engaged in action, intends to act or refuses to
act in a matter related to the representation that is a violation of a legal obligation to the
organization, or a violation of law that reasonably might be imputed to the organization, and
that is likely to result in substantial injury to the organization, then the lawyer shall proceed
as is reasonably necessary in the best interest of the organization. Unless the lawyer
reasonably believes that it is not necessary in the best interest of the organization to do so,
the lawyer shall refer the matter to higher authority in the organization, including, if
warranted by the circumstances, to the highest authority that can act on behalf of the
organization as determined by applicable law.”); id. ¶ 3.3(a)(2) (“A lawyer shall not fail to
disclose to the tribunal legal authority in the controlling jurisdiction known to the lawyer to
be directly adverse to the position of the client and not disclosed by opposing counsel.”).
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their employer—the government—but they are always speaking on behalf
of the legal profession.
C. The Heightened Professional Obligations
of Government Lawyers
Government lawyers, similar to judges, must function in a less partisan
manner than their counterparts in private law practice, which better prepares
them to conduct a reasoned, balanced inquiry when engaging in workplace
assessment speech. Two approaches, generally speaking, help explain the
professional obligations ascribed to a lawyer employed by the regulatory
state: “the agency loyalty approach” and “the public interest approach.”135
The agency loyalty approach “sharply limits the realm in which the lawyer
may permissibly attempt to exert influence over the client.”136 Under this
view, “the government lawyer’s client is the agency that employs the
lawyer, and the lawyer owes the traditional duties of loyalty, zeal, and
confidentiality to the agency just as the lawyer would to a private client.”137
By contrast, the public interest approach “makes serving the public interest
the government lawyer’s primary duty and consequently values the interests
of the lawyer’s agency only to the extent that those interests coincide with
the public interest.”138 The formulation of these approaches, of course, is
not perfect, and a number of scholars and commentators have endeavored to
critique and supplement them.139 Certainly under the public interest
135. Note, supra note 3, at 1173, 1176.
136. Id. at 1173.
137. Id.
138. Id. For further discussion of approaches addressing elements of the public interest,
see Bruce A. Green, Must Government Lawyers “Seek Justice” in Civil Litigation?, 9
WIDENER J. PUB. L. 235, 279–80 (2000) (observing that the duty of government lawyers to
“‘seek justice’ in criminal cases” is “well established” and “seems generally applicable to
government lawyers in civil litigation as well”—a duty which may “imply specific
professional obligations designed to make it more likely that, where the government is a
party, the outcome of the litigation is just and the process is fair”); William H. Simon,
Ethical Discretion in Lawyering, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1083, 1090 (1988) (“The basic maxim
of the approach I propose is this: [t]he lawyer should take those actions that, considering the
relevant circumstances of the particular case, seem most likely to promote justice.”).
139. See, e.g., Hutchinson, supra note 20, at 105 (critiquing the loyalty and public interest
approaches and articulating “a more appropriate model for thinking about [government
lawyers’] professional responsibilities and ethical privileges”); William Josephson & Russell
Pearce, To Whom Does the Government Lawyer Owe the Duty of Loyalty When Clients Are
in Conflict?, 29 HOW. L.J. 539, 565–69 (1986) (arguing that the public interest model runs
counter to representative democracy); Randy J. Kozel, Free Speech and Parity: A Theory of
Public Employee Rights, 53 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1985, 2040 (2012) (introducing “a paritybased theory of employee speech founded on the presumption that government employees
should be treated similarly to other citizens absent a meaningful ground of distinction
beyond the bare fact of employment” which “emphasizes the need to confront two vital
issues that have been neglected in the Supreme Court’s case law: the relevance of
institutional mission, and the evidentiary value of expression”); Keith A. Petty, Professional
Responsibility Compliance and National Security Attorneys: Adopting the Normative
Framework of Internalized Legal Ethics, 2011 UTAH L. REV. 1563, 1583–84 (offering a
“compliance theory” to understand the role of government lawyers, which is a “behavioralstudies approach [that] addresses the nature of individual compliance and provides a
framework for discussing how and why attorneys follow the rules”). See generally William
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approach, and arguably even under the agency loyalty approach, courts
recognize that government lawyers have heightened obligations as
compared to lawyers engaged in private practice. As the Seventh Circuit
Court of Appeals recognized, where members of the private bar “are
appropriately concerned first and foremost with protecting their clients—
even those engaged in wrongdoing—from criminal charges and public
exposure, government lawyers have a higher, competing duty to act in the
public interest.”140 This duty stems from the concept of “the public trust”
owed by a government lawyer, because the government overall “is
responsible to the people in our democracy with its representative form of
government. . . . [T]he lawyer’s employment requires him to observe in the
performance of his professional responsibility the public interest sought to
be served by the governmental organization of which he is a part.”141
Consequently, a government lawyer has an obligation to expose
wrongdoing within government.142
Some commentators have described government lawyers as being held to
“the highest standard” possible as they are “admonished to ‘put loyalty to
the highest moral principles and to country above loyalty to persons, party
or Government department.’”143 This is true for several reasons. First,
“government lawyers cannot be partisan advocates for any single position.
Quite the opposite, government lawyers must pay heed to a range of parties
and interests when undertaking any action.”144 Second, “the government
H. Simon, Visions of Practice in Legal Thought, 36 STAN. L. REV. 469 (1984) (rejecting the
premise of the binary client-lawyer relationship in an adversary system); W. Bradley
Wendel, Government Lawyers, Democracy, and the Rule of Law, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 1333
(2009).
140. In re A Witness Before the Special Grand Jury 2000-2, 288 F.3d 289, 293 (7th Cir.
2002) (citing In re Lindsey, 158 F.3d 1263, 1273 (1998); MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT
¶ 1.13 cmt. (AM. BAR ASS’N 2014)) (“[G]overnment lawyers may have higher duty to rectify
wrongful official acts despite general rule of confidentiality.”).
141. Lindsey, 158 F.3d at 1273.
142. Id.
143. Ralph Nader & Alan Hirsch, A Proposed Right of Conscience for Government
Attorneys, 55 HASTINGS L.J. 311, 313 (2003) (quoting Elisa E. Ugarte, The Government
Lawyer and the Common Good, 40 S. TEX. L. REV. 269, 270 n.3 (1999)); see also United
States v. Pavloyianis, 996 F.2d 1467, 1475 (2d Cir. 1993) (“[W]e normally ascribe a higher
standard of professional and ethical responsibility [to government attorneys.]”); FreeportMcMoran Oil & Gas Co. v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n, 962 F.2d 45, 46 (D.C. Cir.
1992) (rejecting the “remarkable assertion at oral argument that government attorneys ought
not be held to higher standards than attorneys for private litigants”); United States v. Krebs,
788 F.2d 1166, 1176 (6th Cir. 1986) (“United States Attorneys are ‘held to a higher standard
of behavior’ than other attorneys.” (quoting United States v. Young, 470 U.S. 1, 25 (1985))).
Some commentators, however, disagree. See, e.g., Michael C. Duff, Embracing Paradox:
Three Problems the NLRB Must Confront to Resist Further Erosion of Labor Rights in the
Expanding Immigrant Workplace, 30 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 133, 157 n.123 (2009)
(citing Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Reflections on Professional Responsibility
in a Regulatory State, 63 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1105, 1116 (1995)) (“[G]overnment attorneys
owe no ethical duty to a broader public interest. . . . [Further,] attempts by an attorney to
impose such a duty on an agency, assuming it could be identified, would create separation of
powers issues by exalting privately held ethical opinions over the opinions of agency heads,
who, unlike career attorneys, are accountable to the democratically elected executive.”).
144. Note, supra note 3, at 1181.
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lawyer’s primary goal should always be reconciliation—or at least
accommodation—of as many interests as possible, rather than vindication
of any single interest.”145 As a consequence, neither “the agency’s policy
position” nor “abstract notions of the public good . . . can demand the
lawyer’s unqualified allegiance.”146 Third, government lawyers have
special responsibilities to serve the public good and to uphold the
administration of justice.147 This “is an uncontroversial proposition in
mainstream American legal thought” which “finds expression in numerous
historical sources, including both primary sources such as judicial opinions
and statutes, and secondary sources.”148 Relatedly, government lawyers
must “take an oath, separate from their bar oath, to uphold the United States
Constitution and the laws of this nation,” and their “compensation comes
not from a client whose interests they are sworn to protect from the power
of the state, but from the state itself and the public fisc.”149 As the Supreme
Court observed in Polk County v. Dodson,150 a government lawyer “is not
amenable to administrative direction in the same sense as other employees
of the State.”151 Rather, a government lawyer “works under canons of
professional responsibility that mandate his exercise of independent
judgment.”152 As such, a government “lawyer is not, and by the nature of
his function cannot be, the servant of an administrative superior.”153
CONCLUSION
The unusual role lawyer speech plays, both as the embodiment of law
and as the fulfillment of professional obligations, sets it apart from that of
other government employees. Government lawyer speech serving a
checking value function ought to receive heightened protection, whether the
speech is information providing, watchdogging, or whistleblowing, so long
as the speech does not run counter to professional ethics obligations.
Consider the Supreme Court’s recent revisiting of Pickering, Connick, and
Garcetti in a 2014 decision. In Lane v. Franks,154 the Court held that the

145. Id.
146. Id. at 1181–82.
147. See, e.g., Steven K. Berenson, Public Lawyers, Private Values: Can, Should, and
Will Government Lawyers Serve the Public Interest?, 41 B.C. L. REV. 789, 789 (2000)
(“[G]overnment lawyers have greater responsibilities to pursue the common good or the
public interest than their counterparts in private practice, who represent non-governmental
persons and entities.”); Hutchinson, supra note 20, at 114 (“The significant difference
between private lawyers and government lawyers is that the latter have a much greater
obligation to consider the public interest in their decisions and dealings with others than the
former.”).
148. Berenson, supra note 147, at 789.
149. In re A Witness Before the Special Grand Jury 2000-2, 288 F.3d 289, 293 (7th Cir.
2002).
150. 454 U.S. 312 (1981).
151. Id. at 321 (observing the professional independence required of public defenders,
which similarly would be required of all lawyers for the regulatory state).
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. 134 S. Ct. 2369 (2014).
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First Amendment protects the speech of a government employee testifying
under oath about crimes witnessed in the course of employment:
Truthful testimony under oath by a public employee outside the scope
of his ordinary job duties is speech as a citizen for First Amendment
purposes. That is so even when the testimony relates to his public
employment or concerns information learned during that employment.155

The lower court had rejected Lane’s First Amendment argument, giving
what Justice Sotomayor (authoring the unanimous opinion) called “short
shrift to the nature of sworn judicial statements” and “ignor[ing] the
obligation borne by all witnesses testifying under oath.”156 In reconciling
the opinion with Garcetti, Justice Sotomayor explained that the “critical
question under Garcetti is whether the speech at issue is itself ordinarily
within the scope of an employee’s duties, not whether it merely concerns
those duties.”157
The logic of Lane supports a framework where government lawyers’
speech is protected under the First Amendment in the same way as citizens
speaking on a matter of public concern, though admittedly not explicitly in
the Court’s opinion. Justice Sotomayor emphasized that the Court’s
“precedents dating back to Pickering have recognized that speech by public
employees on subject matter related to their employment holds special
value precisely because those employees gain knowledge of matters of
public concern through their employment.”158 Indeed, she observed that the
“importance of public employee speech is especially evident in the context
of this case: a public corruption scandal.”159 Notably, the speech at issue
in both Connick and Garcetti could be said to address the same sort of
public corruption scandals, though the speakers were not under oath to
testify. Yet both, as lawyers, were under similar obligations as officers of
the court and members of the legal profession.
Even if government lawyer speech is protected as contemplated by this
Article, under Pickering, a second question must be addressed: “whether
the government had ‘an adequate justification for treating the employee
differently from any other member of the public’ based on the
government’s needs as an employer.”160 On the one hand, “government
employers often have legitimate ‘interest[s] in the effective and efficient
fulfillment of [their] responsibilities to the public,’ including ‘promot[ing]
efficiency and integrity in the discharge of official duties,’ and
‘maintain[ing] proper discipline in public service.’”161 On the other hand,
“a stronger showing [of government interests] may be necessary if the
employee’s speech more substantially involve[s] matters of public
155. Id. at 2378.
156. Id. at 2378–79 (citation omitted).
157. Id. at 2379.
158. Id.
159. Id. at 2380.
160. Id. (quoting Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 418 (2006)).
161. Id. at 2381 (alterations in original) (quoting Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 150–
51 (1982)).
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concern.”162 In Lane, relevant to the Court was the fact that the
government could not demonstrate an “interest that tips the balance in their
favor. There was no evidence, for example, that Lane’s testimony . . . was
false or erroneous or that Lane unnecessarily disclosed any sensitive,
confidential, or privileged information while testifying.”163 A similar
analysis follows in the case of government lawyers, grounded in
professional duties. Perhaps somewhat paradoxically, the speech of
lawyers is constrained exceptionally by professional ethics rules in order to
effectuate legal advice and advocacy,164 while at the same time requiring
speech in certain circumstances. Thus, to apply the so-called second prong
of Pickering, a court should ask “whether the government had ‘an adequate
justification for treating the employee differently from any other member of
the public’”165 based upon professional conduct rules.
Given the steadily increasing presence of the regulatory state in our
democratic government, the justifications for protecting lawyer speech
based upon its checking value are especially robust in the context of
workplace assessment when the lawyer is carrying out professional
obligations. By applying this framework rather than what the Court did in
Connick and Garcetti, members of the legal profession faced with concerns
about governmental abuse of power would be permitted to exercise their
professional judgment in deciding whether to engage in information
providing, watchdogging, or whistleblowing functions. Protecting the
workplace assessment speech of government lawyers, who are subject to
greater professional obligations and duties than other government
employees, can serve as a desirable check against abuse of power by
officials and at the same time help legitimize the role of the regulatory state
in American democracy.

162. Id. (alterations in original).
163. Id.
164. See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT ¶ 3.4(e) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2014) (“A
lawyer shall not . . . assert personal knowledge of facts in issue except when testifying as a
witness, or state a personal opinion as to the justness of a cause, the credibility of a witness,
the culpability of a civil litigant or the guilt or innocence of an accused . . . .”); id. ¶ 1.2(d)
(“A lawyer shall not counsel a client to engage, or assist a client, in conduct that the lawyer
knows is criminal or fraudulent, but a lawyer may discuss the legal consequences of any
proposed course of conduct with a client and may counsel or assist a client to make a good
faith effort to determine the validity, scope, meaning or application of the law.”); id. ¶ 1.6(a)
(“A lawyer shall not reveal information relating to the representation of a client unless the
client gives informed consent, the disclosure is impliedly authorized in order to carry out the
representation or the disclosure is permitted . . . .”); id. ¶ 1.4(a)(3) (“A lawyer shall . . . keep
the client reasonably informed about the status of the matter . . . .”); id. ¶ 3.6(a) (“A lawyer
who is participating or has participated in the investigation or litigation of a matter shall not
make an extrajudicial statement that the lawyer knows or reasonably should know will be
disseminated by means of public communication and will have a substantial likelihood of
materially prejudicing an adjudicative proceeding in the matter.”); id. ¶ 7.1 (“A lawyer shall
not make a false or misleading communication about the lawyer or the lawyer’s services.”).
165. Lane, 134 S. Ct. at 2380 (quoting Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 418).

